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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE REALITY OF GUIDELINES SENTENCING

THE HONORABLE GERALD W. HEANEY*
The principal objective of Federal Sentencing Guidelines was to reduce
unwarranted sentencing disparity.1 Unfortunately, no thorough, impartial
study supports the view that this objective has been achieved.
I repeat that there is little or no evidence to support the view that
sentencing disparity has been eliminated by the Guidelines. Supporters of the
Guidelines point to studies that support the view that inter-judge sentencing
disparity has been reduced. My quarrel is not with these studies nor with the
results they report. Rather, my concern is with the fact that the studies
measure only one visible element of sentencing disparity, inter-judge disparity,
and ignore the more significant and unwarranted disparities that have been
either continued, caused, or exacerbated by unreviewable decisions of law
enforcement personnel, probation officers, and particularly prosecutors.
Law enforcement officers determine whether to make an arrest and for
what offense. They determine whether they will refer the matter to the state or
federal prosecutors. Each decision affects the ultimate sentence the offender
will receive. If the matter is referred to a federal prosecutor, he or she then
determines whether to charge the defendant, what to charge, and when to
charge.
Thereafter, the prosecutor determines whether to enter plea
negotiations, and if so, the terms of the plea. The probation officers then
prepare a presentence report largely based on information obtained from law
enforcement’s and prosecutors’ files and make sentencing recommendations,
which are most frequently accepted by sentencing judges. Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, these decisions have a far greater impact on time
served by a defendant than any decision made by the sentencing judge.
Moreover, each decision involves an exercise of discretion, an exercise that
can and does dramatically affect the time an offender will serve.2

* United States Senior Circuit Judge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals (1966-).
1. Other objectives were (a) to ensure that similarly situated defendants received similar
sentences, (b) to require a defendant to serve all or nearly all of the sentence pronounced by the
court, and (c) to raise sentencing levels for narcotics offenses and some white-collar crimes. In
my view, objective (a) has not been achieved, objective (b) has been achieved, and objective (c)
has been achieved, particularly with respect to drug offenses.
2. As I noted in my article on the Sentencing Guidelines:
One probation officer explained,
293

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

294

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 44:293

If we truly want to measure whether disparities continue under the
Sentencing Guidelines, we have no alternative but to undertake a
comprehensive study to determine the impact of Guidelines legislation at every
stage of the criminal process. To date, no such study has been undertaken by
the Sentencing Commission or any other adequately funded group to determine
the extent to which decisions of law enforcement officers, probation officers,
and prosecutors have resulted in unwarranted sentencing disparity.3
You’ll see any number of presentence reports -- because we put everybody in who is
involved and everybody who comes forth in the relevant conduct portion -- if there were a
way of adding all those names up, you’re going to find a lot of people who weren’t
prosecuted, maybe because they weren’t chargeable in the first place. But that was
determined later. Maybe it’s because they were cooperating or maybe it’s because they
just wanted to take the top ten percent of this group of offenders. Usually we don’t know
why. Maybe it’s because they can’t get the really bad guy or the bad gal because they
haven’t been able to develop the information to that point.
Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 161, 191, n.74 (1991) (quoting Interview with United States Probation Office, Nov. 1.,
1990, Tr. at 20).
3. As Professor Frank Bowman states in his article on the Guidelines, “The somewhat
troubling truth is that the actual evidence on the question of the Guidelines’ effect on disparity is
scant.” Frank O. Bowman, III, The Quality of Mercy Must be Restrained, and Other Lessons in
Learning to Love the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 WIS. L. REV. 679, 716 (1996).
The staff of the Sentencing Commission, with an outside panel of experts, has recently
completed a study designed to show (1) disparity created by differences among judges and (2)
disparity related to the characteristics of the offender such as gender and race. As expected, the
study concludes that the Guidelines have reduced disparity among judges by nearly one-half.
This study will be published in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology in the near future.
A careful study published in the Journal of Law and Economics in April 1999 reached a
similar conclusion. See James M. Anderson et al., Measuring Interjudge Sentencing Disparity:
Before and After the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 271 (1999). This study
defines inter-judge disparity as “the differences in average nominal prison sentence lengths for
comparable caseloads assigned to different judges.” Id. at 271. The study found the decrease in
inter-judge disparity to be concentrated within the violent, weapons, and drug crimes. The study
notes:
Despite the importance that the progenitors of the Guidelines placed on interjudge
sentencing disparity and our focus on it in this paper, it would be a mistake to equate
interjudge sentencing disparity with “unwarranted sentencing disparity” . . . . As many
commentators have noted, considerable disparity exists in charging policies at various
U.S. Attorney’s offices in the policies of law-enforcement personnel, and in the manner in
which the probation officer conducts an independent investigation of the offense. The
Guidelines did nothing to address these sources of disparity.
. . . . Reduced discretion for judges at the end of the process magnifies the
importance of decisions made by the prosecutor, probation office, and law enforcement
officials. Since the sentence will be determined by what is proven by a preponderance of
the evidence under the Guidelines, the prosecutor exerts far more influence over the
sentence that she did pre-Guidelines. Similarly, the offender’s sentence will directly
reflect any disparity between probation officers, because they are the “Guidelines
experts” . . . .
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By giving prior actors (law enforcement officials, probation officers, and
prosecutors) more influence over the ultimate sentence, the Guidelines provide
opportunities for these earlier actors to pursue their own agendas that did not exist preGuidelines . . . .
In addition, mean sentence length has substantially increased under the Guidelines.
Id. at 301-02. See also Lisa M. Farabee, Disparate Departures Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Tale of Two Districts, 30 CONN. L. REV. 569 (1998); A. Abigail Payne, Does InterJudge Disparity Really Matter? An Analysis of the Effects of Sentencing Reforms in Three
Federal District Courts, 17 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 337 (1997). Payne states:
I provide a comprehensive statistical evaluation of the effect of the uniform Guidelines
and mandatory minimum sentence statutes on the sentencing practices in three Federal
district courts. I compare case resolution and mean prison terms in the period before and
after the adoption of mandatory sentencing and uniform Guidelines. There are four main
results: (1) There has been a dramatic shift in plea bargaining, where defendants who used
to change their initial plea of “not guilty” to “guilty” now plead guilty initially; (2) there
has been a very significant increase in the prison terms for drug offenses (which are not
subject to mandatory minimums) and very little change in the prison terms for other
offenses (which are not subject to mandatory minimums); (3) the disparity attributable to
differences among judges before the sentencing reforms accounts for less than 5% of the
total variation in sentences; and (4) the effect of the uniform Guidelines on the variability
in sentencing is negligible, but it decreased the level of inter-judge disparity for some but
not all of the district courts studied.
Id. at 338. Payne also states:
The results raise two issues that should be considered before enacting any further
reforms that limit judicial discretion or increase prison time served. First, given that interjudge disparity represents a small portion of the total variation in sentences, we must
question whether sentencing reforms enacted to reduce this form of disparity is worth the
severe reduction in judicial flexibility that necessarily results from such reforms. Second,
given that more defendants are receiving positive sentences and that the prison terms
served are longer, is the cost to detain these defendants outweighed by a greater
deterrence of criminal behavior or other societal benefits?
Id. at 358.
Jeffery Standen, writing in the California Law Review, concluded:
In the shadow of the Sentencing Guidelines, traditional plea bargaining will soon be
an historical curiosity. When judges controlled sentences, prosecutors and defense
counsel bargained within a predictable range of judicial sentencing outcomes. They still
bargain today, except that now the prosecutor, not the judge, decides in which range the
bargaining will occur. Thus the prosecutor, through his charging decisions, has the power
to determine the possible sentence. The outcome of the bargaining game is fixed before
the first ball is thrown.
It was predictable that an attempt to control the discretion inherent in the criminal
justice system by trying to eliminate one facet of it . . . would have the harmful
consequence of merely concentrating its exercise in the hands of another actor. The
Guidelines transfer the power of the judge to the prosecutor. . . .
. . . . It would be better to accommodate and disperse the discretion that ineluctably
inheres in any body of statutes that must, for the sake of completeness, describe conduct
in ways that overlap, than to live with a system of criminal justice that, in the name of
eliminating discretion, enables those hired to prosecute criminals also to judge them.
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I concede that a study of the nature suggested would be expensive, time
consuming, and very difficult.
Undoubtedly it would, but necessary
nonetheless. Some would argue that such a study is unnecessary because law
enforcement officers and prosecutors have always had the authority to make
the kind of decisions they presently make.4 They have, but circumstances have
changed. Law enforcement has always determined whether to arrest, for what,
and to who to refer the offender. Moreover, prosecutors have always
determined what to charge and when to charge and whether to consummate
plea agreements with offenders and the scope of the agreement. In the preGuidelines era in the federal system, however, the decisions of prosecutors
were always subject to review by a judge, who is largely insulated by the
pressures of public criticism by a lifetime appointment.
The principal effects of the Sentencing Guidelines have been twofold:
First, to enhance the discretion of law enforcement, prosecutors, and probation
officers in the sentencing process and to diminish that of the district judge; and
second, to confine many more offenders to prison for longer periods of time.
Specifically, the number of federal prisoners has increased from about 41,000
in 1987 to more than 118,000 in 1998. During this same period, the average
sentence has increased in length by at least 2½ years and sentences for some
crimes have increased by many more years than that. The increased numbers
are driven in a large measure by three factors: dramatic increases in sentences
for drug offenders; mandatory minimum sentences for violent offenders and
persistent drug offenders; and eliminating probation as an option for
Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 153738 ( 1993).
David Robinson, writing in the Washington University Law Quarterly, concluded:
Guidelines are premised on a mistaken notion that the largest problem in federal
sentencing is disparity in the sentences judicially imposed on different defendants, not in
erecting a system that is rational and just. Further rigidities have been added by
enactment of harsh mandatory minimum statutes, most importantly in the drug
enforcement area. . . . Open-ended prosecutive discretion should be ended and substantial
discretion of federal judges restored.
David Robinson, Jr., The Decline and Potential Collapse of Federal Guideline Sentencing, 74
WASH. U. L.Q. 881, 912 (1996).
4. Professor Bowman states:
[W]hat Guideline critics are complaining about is the possibility that prosecutors will
manipulate sentences downward, by charging less than the most serious provable offense
or withholding incriminating evidence from the court. . . .
There are two basic responses to this critique. First, prosecutors undoubtedly do,
through charging decisions and plea bargains, sometimes seek, or agree to, lower than the
maximum possible sentences. They have always done that. With respect to charging
decisions, the Guidelines themselves do not even attempt to limit the historical practice.
Indeed, it is difficult to imagine a system which could eliminate prosecutorial charging
discretion.
Bowman, supra note 3, at 726-27.
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nonviolent, first-time drug offenders. The latter notwithstanding studies that
show first-time drug offenders who are imprisoned are five times more likely
to recidivate than comparable offenders placed on probation.
As the raw number of federal prisoners has increased, so too has the
percentage of black male inmates. They now represent nearly 40% of the
prison population even though they only represent 12% of the nation’s
population. The increase in the black prison population has been largely
driven by the numbers of young black males who have been convicted of
possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine. Drug offenders now
represent nearly 60% of all inmates in federal prisons and black males
constitute more than 45% of those confined for these offenses.
Another impact of the Sentencing Guidelines and mandatory minimum
sentences is now being felt. Increasingly we have large numbers of elderly
inmates who are in poor health. The cost of imprisoning these inmates is
increasing dramatically because of the medical care they require. Already
there is talk in congressional circles of enacting legislation that would permit
prison authorities to release older inmates with health problems before the
expiration of their terms. I predict this legislation is inevitable and will result
in older prisoners who are very little risk to society being released and returned
to their homes or communities with little ability to find work or care for
themselves. They will eventually become wards of the state.
In closing, I certainly do not share the view that discretion should be
eliminated from the sentencing process. To the contrary, discretion is
necessary to achieve justice and fairness. The question rather is who and to
what extent will the various players in the system exercise discretion.
Realistically, discretion will always be shared. In my view, however, the
judge, a true neutral in the sentencing process, must retain substantial control
over the sentence that will be imposed.
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